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Somaliland or, more accurately, Somalilanders have
achieved a remarkable amount in the past twenty years. In
fact, those achievements are so significant, and hold such
potential to help all of us – Somali and non-Somali – to
understand what is possible elsewhere in the Somali Horn
and even more widely. It is worth taking a hard and
objective look at what has happened.
Unfortunately, there is a tendency in some quarters to
romanticise Somaliland’s achievements – which has the
rather counter-intuitive effect of obscuring both their
nature and importance. For example, in mid-2011 the
UK’s Daily Mail1 eagerly picked up on a paper by a
Stanford PhD candidate2 to support an argument that
Somaliland is “proof” that aid does not work – a theme
that was also pushed in The Economist3.  The line ran that
huge sums of aid have been committed to successive
efforts in southern Somalia to form and support a
government, with little obvious success; whereas
Somaliland has received no external support but has been
successful in establishing peace, then a government, and
– in the past decade – a viable multi-party democracy.
This proposition is echoed by some Somali commentators
who suggest that Somalis will succeed only when they
are left alone.
There is a germ of truth in there, but it is not a particularly
helpful argument. The reality is that Somali society has
long been heavily oriented towards trade. Linkages with
many “external” communities – whether economic,
political, religious or personal – are long-standing, deep
and vital. That is as true for Somaliland as it is for
Puntland, Mogadishu or any of the other Somali areas.
So, what has happened over the past two decades in
Somaliland? Focusing particularly on the political realm,
we need to start a little further back. The Somali National
Movement (SNM) was one of the first movements
established in the early 1980s to resist the increasingly
dictatorial regime of General Mohamed Siyad Barre.
Right from the start, the SNM built a notable degree of
democracy into its governance structure. 
The SNM were criticised at the time, and since, for their
domination by the Isaaq clan family. That sentiment still
permeates Somaliland politics. Again, all is not quite what
it seems. 
The SNM, in fact, preferred to form alliances with
non-Isaaq clans, or to allow membership of non-Isaaq
individuals in a personal capacity rather than as
representatives of their clans. However, that did not stop
the two largest non-Isaaq clans in Somaliland from taking
a lead in the early formation of Somaliland. In 1993, one
of the most important peace conferences took place in
Borama, the principal town in territory of the non-Isaaq
Gadabursi clan. When Isaaq clans have fought amongst
themselves, it has fallen to the likes of the Gadabursi and,
to the east, the Dhulbahante, to step in and broker peace. 
Herein also lie the roots of what remains one of
Somaliland’s greatest political challenges. While it was
at the outset a project of a broad group of clans, the Isaaq
clans have always held a numerical dominance. When
several of the Isaaq clans have found some way of
working together, the others have become marginalised
– and enthusiasm for the Somaliland project has waned.
In 2013, there is a relatively strong alliance of Isaaq clans
at the heart of power, and many outside those groups are
feeling increasingly disgruntled with their status. 
Returning briefly to the theme we started with, the
periodic intervention of non-Isaaq clans epitomises a way
in which “outsiders” have in fact been critical to
Somaliland’s stability. In much the same way as it was
the involvement of two clans who were not part of the
fractious core that allowed Somaliland to establish its
371. Ian Birrell,“Somaliland: The former British colony that shows Africa doesn’t need our millions to flourish”, Daily Mail website, July 23rd 2011. 
2. Nicholas Eubank,  “Taxation, Political Accountability, and Foreign Aid: Lessons from Somaliland”, unpublished paper, March 26th 2011.
3. Baobab blog, “Aid and Somaliland: Mo money mo problems”, The Economist website, June 24th 2011.
relatively plural political system, both Somali and
non-Somali outsiders have played important roles over
the years in helping to mediate conflicts and support
peace initiatives. The difference between political
processes in Somaliland and Somalia lies in the nature
and scale of external intervention. Somaliland has
succeeded because the political process has been led by
those in the country – but also because there have been
timely interventions from people outside the immediate
crises and conflicts that have arisen from time to time.
Narrowing the focus to the past few years, until the
presidential elections in 2010 Somaliland politics were
dominated by the governing party established by late
President Egal. It drew support from a range of clans and
– significantly – Egal himself was never part of the SNM
struggle. When he died in 2002, Egal’s Gadabursi
vice-president, Dahir Riyale Kahin, assumed the
presidency in a peaceful transfer of power. President
Dahir Riyale then won an election in his own right a year
later – albeit by a wafer-thin majority. Many of those
associated with the long SNM struggle were heavily
involved with the losing party, Kulmiye, and it was to
their credit that – after some tense negotiations – they
conceded defeat.
In 2010, the balance of power shifted when the Kulmiye
candidate, and past chairman of the SNM, Ahmed
Mohamed “Silanyo”, won the presidential election. He
has managed to keep together a coalition strongly centred
on his own Habar Ja’lo clan – one of the Isaaq clan family
– and a number of other key Isaaq partners. The local
council elections which took place on November 28th
2012 consolidated this power shift. UDUB collapsed 
as a political entity before the election – leaving the way
open for Kulmiye to win many councils that it had not
held before. 
One of the consequences of the power shift has been an
increase in opposition to Somaliland’s continued
independence in the east and, to a lesser extent, the
western areas of the country. However, Xaqsoor, the
political association that drew the strongest support from
the non-Isaaq clans in the east, and from a smaller
non-Isaaq clan in the west, failed to achieve the number
of votes it had been hoping for because polling could not
proceed in some of their stronghold towns. Much of the
protest after the election, some of which turned violent as
police cracked down heavily on demonstrators, was about
the failure of some of the clan groups who had been at
the heart of the formation of Somaliland in 1991 to
achieve electoral success.
The local elections demonstrated the importance of some
sort of new voter register in the future. This time around,
the register used in the 2010 presidential election was
abandoned. The process of counting and registering
voters in the lead up to that election had proven extremely
divisive. It was, after all, the first time there had been a
concerted effort to count voters by region in many
decades, and the results of that count effectively
determined relative clan populations – and therefore
voting weights. As a result, there was no appetite after the
2010 poll for updating or improving the register. 
In 2012, the primary insurance against multiple voting
remained the inking of fingers – much the same as in the
2002 council elections. However, by popular demand an
open list was employed in 2012, whereas in 2002 parties
operated closed lists of candidates – voters simply
selected the party of their choice. For most Somalilanders,
it certainly felt more democratic to be voting for specific
candidates; but this had the unintended consequence 
of significantly increasing the incentive for each
candidate to throw resources into their campaign. Many
spent huge sums of money. On election day, funds were
spent on hiring trucks to shift voters to polling stations,
buying bleach to remove ink from fingers and other
election “expenses”. Not all of this activity was
fraudulent, by any means. For some, trucks were required
to bring isolated nomadic groups to polling stations. But
there is no doubt that many people voted more than once,
and finger-cleansing with bleach was openly practised 
and common.
After Borama
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Women continue to comprise the majority of voters, yet
it remains extremely hard for women to enter formal
politics. Perhaps a quota is the only way to achieve this,
and that possibility remains a work in progress. The
Guurti still lacks a formal selection process. At the
moment, new members are selected by the family of those
who die or are otherwise unable to continue to serve –
hardly a transparent or accountable system. The
constitution says new members should be elected, but
offers no detail on how that might happen. 
None of this renders Somaliland’s remarkable successes
any less impressive. Peaceful elections, the smooth
transition in 2010 of power from a losing incumbent
president to his successor – these are huge milestones in
any new multi-party democracy which have been
successfully negotiated. But some of the fault lines that
have existed for many decades continue to influence
political processes today. So far, these are probably the
kinds of conflict that are inevitable as a political entity
struggles to define itself, both to the full breadth of 
those who live within its claimed borders and to the
outside world. 
Past experience offers some cogent pointers to future
challenges. Clan is not everything in Somaliland – but it
remains critically important. Sometimes its role is
positive, sometimes divisive. Alliances also shift, so the
fact that the current government draws support from a
number of key clan groups does not mean that will
continue to be the case in the future. A way needs to be
found to give non-Isaaq clans a real engagement in the
political scene, and in the development process more
generally. Clan must be seen as part of the answer, and
there is plenty to build on. 
Most importantly, if Somaliland is to consolidate recent
achievements, its leaders will need to continue to 
develop their relationships with neighbouring clans and
countries – and with the wider world – to expand trade
and investment, to build infrastructure, and to start to
reduce astonishingly low rates of employment and 
high dependence on remittances. Aid certainly has a role
to play, but not in a manner that dominates local
processes. If Somaliland’s success shows us anything, it
is the importance of external links – but also the
importance of real local “ownership” of political and
development processes.
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